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Thirty years ago Professor Vilet noted that a surprisingly large
number of lawyers in Oklahoma did not seem to understand what was
meant by the term "discovery procedure."' This is certainly no longer
the case, as is indicated by the Foreward to a recent issue of Litigalion
which proclaimed, "In an important sense modem American litigation
is discovery."2 The past thirty years have seen the development and
increasing use of discovery procedures so that today these procedures
are the primary means attorneys utilize to ascertain the facts which are
presented at trial. In fact, through skillful use of discovery procedures,
lawyers can in most cases avoid the time and expense of trial and re-
solve their lawsuits through settlement.3
This article is the first in a series of three articles dealing with civil
discovery in Oklahoma to be published in this journal. This article
addresses the general principles that are applicable to all discovery pro-
cedures in Oklahoma. The purposes of discovery procedures and the
types of proceedings where discovery is available are examined. The
relevance standard which determines the scope of discovery is ana-
* I wish to thank Orley R. Lilly, Jr., Donald H. Gjerdingen, and James M. Sturdivant for
their helpful comments and suggestions. I am also grateful to Elizabeth K. Balaschak and Ali
M.M. Mojdehi for research assistance and to Kay Hawkins for assistance in the preparation of the
manuscript.
** Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa College of Law; B.A., University of
California at Santa Barbara; M.A., University of California at Santa Barbara; M.B.A., University
of California at Berkeley; J.D., Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California at Berkeley.
1. Vliet, Oklahoma Discovery Procedures, 2 OKLA. L. REV. 294, 297 (1949). Another writer
stated in Note, Procedure.- Pre-Trial Disco very, 2 OKLA. L. REV. 100 (1949): "Members of the bar
have either been unaware of [pre-trial discovery] procedures or have been reluctant to make use
thereof to any great extent." Id at 100.
2. Discovery, 4 LITIGATION 7 (Fall 1977) (emphasis in original).
3. Id
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lyzed, and the defenses to discovery, such as privilege and attorney
work product, are discussed in detail. The uses of discovery products
other than at trial as well as the discretionary role of the trial court in
permitting or restricting discovery and the extent of appellate review of
discovery orders are examined.
The remaining two articles in this series will appear in subsequent
issues of this journal and will survey the numerous discovery devices
available in Oklahoma including interrogatories, requests for admis-
sion, requests for production and inspection of documents and other
tangible property, medical examinations, and depositions upon oral ex-
amination. These articles will compare the advantages and limitations
of the discovery devices that are available in Oklahoma and will ex-
amine techniques for utilizing them effectively. In addition, the inno-
vations in discovery procedures that have been made in federal courts
during the past decade4 will be discussed to illustrate possible future
developments in Oklahoma state court discovery procedures.
II. PURPOSES OF DISCOVERY
Nearly forty years ago the Oklahoma Supreme Court examined
the purposes of discovery in State ex rel. Westerheide v. Shilling.5 The
plaintiffs in Westerheide sought to take the deposition of the defendant
in accordance with the Oklahoma Statutes.6 The defendant objected
on the grounds that the plaintiffs were not seeking to take the defend-
ant's deposition for the purpose of preserving his testimony for trial,
but were instead attempting to ascertain, in advance, the evidence the
defendant would introduce at trial. The trial court sustained the de-
fendant's objection and ruled that "there is no right to take a deposition
unless there is a right to use it."7 The Oklahoma Supreme Court re-
versed the trial court and held that a deposition could properly be used,
not only to preserve the testimony of a witness for trial, but also to
ascertain the facts at issue in a lawsuit and enable the discovering party
to better prepare for trial. The court concluded:
[Tihe purpose of the parties to an action in court should be to
4. These innovations are set out and discussed in Proposed Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Discovery, 48 F.R.D. 487 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Advi-
sory Notes to the 1970 Amendments]; Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85
F.R.D. 521 (1980).
5. 190 Okla. 305, 123 P.2d 674 (1942).
6. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 434 (1971).
7. 190 Okla. at 306, 123 P.2d at 676.
1980]
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ascertain the truth and see that justice is done and that the
right party prevails. This purpose will best be served by giv-
ing a liberal construction to the provisions of the Code as we
are directed to do. . . . No doubt one purpose in permitting
either party to commence taking depositions as soon as sum-
mons is served on the defendant is to make the depositions
available for use in joining issues and in preparing for trial as
well as for use at the trial. If it had been intended that they be
taken only for use at the trial, the Legislature would probably
have provided that they could be taken only after the issues
are made up. It has been well said that "a suit at law is
neither a surprise party nor a guessing contest, but an attempt
to further justice." . . . And it would ordinarily clarify the
issues and shorten the trial if each party knew in advance
what his adversary is going to testify to, and as Justice Brewer
said, "justice will not be apt to suffer" if each party has such
knowledge.
We conclude that. . . . [t]he right to take the deposition
is not limited by the restrictions on its use. The result is that
each party may, after summons is served on the defendant,
take the deposition of the opposite party without first estab-
lishing his motive in taking it, or agreeing to be bound by his
testimony or to use it at the trial, and it is not material
whether the opposite party resides in the county, is in good
health, does not intend to leave the county or state, or intends
to be present at the trial. The fact that relators may have had
a threefold purpose in taking the deposition of [the defendant]
(to aid in further pleading, to aid in preparing for trial, and to
use at the trial if favorable) does not detract from their right
to take the deposition.'
The Westerheide court thus explicitly sanctioned the use of the
deposition for pretrial discovery in Oklahoma.9 Since Westerheide was
decided in 1942, discovery procedures have been increasingly utilized
in Oklahoma as numerous statutes have been adopted to broaden the
availability of discovery. There are now approximately sixty sections
of title 12 of the Oklahoma Statutes which deal with discovery, and the
Oklahoma Supreme Court has written an increasing number of opin-
ions interpreting these discovery statutes. For the most part, Oklahoma
courts have followed the teaching of Westerheide to interpret discovery
8. Id at 308-09, 123 P.2d at 678 (citations omitted).
9. Westerheide is discussed with approval in Vliet, supra note 1, at 295-99; Note, supra note
1; Note, Evaluation ofJudicialAdministration in Oklahoma, 4 OKLA. L. REV. 369, 371-73 (1951).
[Vol. 16:184
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statutes liberally' 0 so that the parties to a lawsuit can use discovery
tools to obtain as much information as possible concerning the issues
prior to trial. If all parties to a lawsuit are given free access to pertinent
information through use of discovery tools, they will then be in a better
position to present this information to the trier of fact, and the deci-
sion-making process of the trier of fact will thereby be furthered."
Moreover, affording parties maximum access to information pertaining
to the lawsuit enhances the likelihood of settlement prior to trial,' 2 and
hence promotes judicial economy.
III. PROCEEDINGS IN WHICH DISCOVERY IS AVAILABLE
The discovery procedures found in title 12 of the Oklahoma Stat-
utes are generally available in all civil actions. It has been determined,
for example, that interrogatories may be used in probate proceedings' 3
and depositions may be taken in paternity proceedings.' 4 In addition,
specific statutory provisions permit the use of discovery procedures in
various special proceedings and in proceedings before administrative
agencies. For example, parties before the Workers' Compensation
Court may use the procedures for taking depositions, serving interroga-
10. OKLA. CT. R. 14. "Discovery rules and statutes shall be liberally construed .... " Id
11. In 1976, the Oklahoma Supreme Court discussed the policy behind civil discovery in
Oklahoma courts.
The purposes of the discovery statute are to facilitate and simplify identification of
the issues by limiting the matters in controversy, avoid unnecessary testimony, promote
justice, provide a more efficient and speedy disposition of cases, eliminate secrets and
surprise, prevent the trial of a lawsuit from becoming a guessing game, and lead to fair
and just settlements without the necessity of trial. Discovery statutes permit obtaining of
evidence in the sole possession of one party which is unavailable to opposing counsel
through the utilization of independent means. For these reasons, the rules dealing with
discovery, production, and inspection are to be liberally construed. The intent of the
Oklahoma discovery statutes is to attempt to provide procedures which promote accurate
information in advance of trial concerning the actual facts and circumstances of a con-
troversy, rather than to aid in its concealment. The utilization of discovery enables attor-
neys to better prepare and evaluate their cases. Ascertainment of truth and the ultimate
disposition of lawsuit [sic] is better accomplished when parties are well educated through
discovery as to their respective claims in advance of trial. Pretrial discovery procedures
are intended to enhance truth-seeking process, and good faith compliance with such pro-
cedures is both desirable and necessary.
State ex rel Remington Arms Co. v. Powers, 552 P.2d 1150, 1152 (Okla. 1976) (footnotes omitted).
12. Discovery, supra note 2.
13. Stone v. Hodges, 435 P.2d 165 (Okla. 1967). See also In re Abbott, 7 Okla. 78, 54 P. 319
(1898) (holding that a probate judge was authorized to take depositions and could punish for
contempt a witness who refused to testify at his deposition). In addition, OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 43
(1971), specifically provides in contested or noncontested will cases for the taking of depositions of
nonresident witnesses whose testimony pertains to the execution of the will. See In re Estate of
Hardesty, 545 P.2d 823 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975).
14. 4 OKLA. Op. ATT'Y GEN. 452 (1972).
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tories and requesting the production of documents that are applicable
in civil actions."5 Depositions may also be taken in a proceeding before
an administrative agency governed by the Oklahoma Administrative
Procedures Act by either the agency or any party to the proceeding. 16
Specific statutory provisions give the Oklahoma Human Rights Com-
mission the power to compel answers to its interrogatories, require pro-
duction of documents, and compel attendance of witnesses at
depositions, in connection with its hearings and investigations.' 7 And
although the issue has not yet been settled, it appears that depositions
also will be permitted in connection with hearings under Oklahoma's
Tenured Teacher Statute.'"
The civil discovery procedures discussed in this article, however,
are not available in criminal actions.' 9 Moreover, although
Oklahoma's Uniform Arbitration Act 20 gives arbitrators the power to
subpoena witnesses and documents for arbitration hearings as well as
the power to authorize the taking of depositions of witnesses who are
unable to attend arbitration hearings,2 it appears that these provisions
do not permit the use of depositions or requests for document produc-
tion for pre-hearing discovery,22 unless the parties so stipulate.
Generally, discovery is available only in connection with a pend-
ing civil action or proceeding.23 Prior to 1969 a plaintiff apparently had
15. O.K. Iron & Metal Co. v. Sandoval, 434 P.2d 247, 249 (Okla. 1967); OKLA. WORK. COMP.
CT. R. 2, 8. See also Lewis Drilling Co. v. Brooks, 451 P.2d 956, 960 (Okla. 1969). In addition, a
court may order an employee claiming compensation under the Workers' Compensation Act to
submit to a medical examination. OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, § 25 (Supp. 1980).
16. OKLA. STAT. tit. 75, § 315(1) (1971). One commentator has suggested recently that inter-
rogatories and requests for production of documents may be used in any proceedings governed by
Oklahoma's Administrative Procedures Act. Cox, The Oklahoma Adminirtrative Procedures Act:
Fifteen Years of Interpretation, 31 OKLA. L. REV. 886, 912-13 (1978).
17. Oklahoma Human Rights Comm'n v. Wilson Certified Foods, Inc., 536 P.2d 349 (Okla.
1975); OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, § 1501(6) (Supp. 1980); id §§ 1507(a), 1508 (1971).
18. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 6-103.7(2) (Supp. 1980). Whether depositions are allowed in
connection with hearings under Oklahoma's Tenured Teacher Statute is discussed in Note, Discov-
ery. An Examination of Oklahoma's Tenured Teacher Statute, 32 OKLA. L. REV. 205 (1979).
19. Parmenter v. State, 377 P.2d 842 (Okla. Crim. App. 1963).
20. OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, §§ 801-818 (Supp. 1980).
21. Id § 807.
22. See United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 93 N.M. 105, 117, 597 P.2d 290, 302,
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 911 (1979); M. DOMKE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARI-
TRATION § 27.01 (1968 & Supp. 1979). But see Willenken, Discovery inAid ofArbitration, 6 LITI-
GATION 16 (Winter 1980).
23. Nonetheless, the Uniform Perpetuation of Testimony Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 538.1-
.13 (1971 & Supp. 1980), provides that a person who may be a party to a future action that he is
presently unable to bring or defend may petition the court for authorization to perpetuate the
testimony of other persons by taking their depositions. The Uniform Perpetuation of Testimony
Act will be noted in a subsequent article in this series.
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no right to conduct discovery if his petition did not state facts sufficient
to constitute a cause of action.24 But section 434 of title 12 of the
Oklahoma Statutes was amended in 1969 to provide that the pendency
of a challenge to the validity of service, the jurisdiction of the court or
venue, or a demurrer to the sufficiency of the petition does not affect
the right of the parties to take depositions.25 Since this amendment,
section 434 has been construed by the Oklahoma Supreme Court to
permit a plaintiff in a class action to conduct discovery using deposi-
tions and interrogatories even after the defendants had filed motions to
challenge the plaintiffs standing to bring the action.26 Accordingly, the
parties should be allowed to conduct discovery until judgment is actu-
ally rendered in an action 27 despite whatever challenges may be made
to the bringing of the action.
IV. THE SCOPE OF DISCOVERY-THE RELEVANCE STANDARD
Rule 14 of the Rules for District Courts for Oklahoma provides
that discovery rules and statutes are to be liberally construed.28 In
keeping with this principle of liberal construction, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court has held. that information is discoverable even though
it would not be admissible as evidence at trial, so long as it might rea-
sonably lead to the discovery of other evidence which could be admit-
ted at trial.29 When ruling on the admissibility of evidence at trial, the
court must balance the probative value of the evidence against the dan-
gers of unfair prejudice, issue confusion, misleading of the jury, undue
delay and needless presentation of cumulative evidence." These fac-
tors are much less important during discovery than they are at trial.
Accordingly, the standard of relevance for discovery should be consid-
erably broader than the standard of relevance applied by a trial court
24. Holt v. Jones, 208 Okla. 30, 34, 252 P.2d 460, 464 (1952).
25. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 434 (1971).
26. Independent School Dist. v. Sarkeys, Inc., 569 P.2d 1000 (Okla. 1977).
27. Central Sur. & Ins. Corp. v. Kelley, 327 P.2d 643 (Okla. 1958), decided before 1969, is an
interesting example of a situation where a party might forego entry of judgment in his favor in
order to conduct discovery. The defendant in Kelley elected to stand on its overruled motion to
dismiss in an attempt to perfect an appeal from the trial court's order. However, the plaintiffs
refused to have judgment entered in their favor because they wanted to take further depositions
before the defendant's appeal, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that they had the right to
do so. Id at 644.
28. Note 10 supra.
29. Unit Rig & Equip. Co. v. East, 514 P.2d 396 (Okla. 1973); Carman v. Fishel, 418 P.2d
963, 973-74 (Okla. 1966); Stone v. Coleman, 557 P.2d 904, 9.05-06 (Okla. 1976) (dictum).
30. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2403 (Supp. 1980).
19801
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when ruling on the admissibility of evidence at trial.3'
Even though liberally construed in Oklahoma, the relevance stan-
dard does limit the scope of discovery. In contrast to the practice in
federal courts, 32 Oklahoma state courts have applied the relevance
standard to bar discovery of the existence and amount of liability insur-
ance coverage of a party, absent a showing of special circumstances.33
Although such information might be helpful to a plaintiff in negotiat-
ing a settlement, it generally is not discoverable because it has no bear-
ing on the determination of the case on its merits and would not lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence.34 Discovery may be permitted
though, if special circumstances make the information relevant to the
issues in the action. Examples are where the ownership of a vehicle is
in issue and the defendant's liability insurance policy is used to prove
the defendant's ownership of the vehicle,35 or where the existence and
amount of liability insurance coverage of a governmental entity deter-
mine the extent of waiver of governmental immunity.36 The Oklahoma
Supreme Court has also held that evidence of a party's financial worth
is not a proper subject of pre-trial discovery where it is not relevant to
the issues in an action.37 Even in cases where a plaintiff seeks punitive
damages and evidence of the defendant's financial worth would be ad-
missible at trial on the issue of the amount of punitive damages that
should properly be awarded, evidence of the defendant's financial
worth is not discoverable without a prima facie factual showing that
the plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive damages.38
31. Unfortunately, it has been suggested that the scope of document production in response
to a subpoena for the taking of a deposition is restricted to documents that would be admissible in
evidence at trial. Stone v. Coleman, 557 P.2d 904, 906 (Okla. 1976) (dictum); Carman v. Fishel,
418 P.2d 963, 972-73 (Okla. 1966) (dictum); Vliet, supra note 1, at 305. The various procedures
available in Oklahoma state courts to obtain document production will be discussed in the next
article in this series.
32. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2).
33. Hall v. Paul, 549 P.2d 343, 344 (Okla. 1976); Carman v. Fishel, 418 P.2d 963, 973-75
(Okla. 1966); Peters v. Webb, 316 P.2d 170, 174 (Okla. 1957).
34. Carman v. Fishel, 418 P.2d 963, 974-75 (Okla. 1966).
35. Id at 973 (dictum).
36. Lamont Indep. School Dist. v. Swanson, 548 P.2d 215 (Okla. 1976). For other examples
of such special circumstances, see Note, Discovery: Oklahoma'r New Statutes on Production and
Written Interrogatories, 20 OKLA. L. REv. 435, 438 (1967).
37. Cox v. Theus, 569 P.2d 447, 450 (Okla. 1977).
38. Id Cases from other jurisdictions dealing with pretrial discovery of a party's financial
worth are collected in Annot., 27 A.L.R. 3d 1375 (1969 & Supp. 1980).
[Vol. 16:184
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V. DEFENSES TO DISCOVERY
Even though discovery may be sought in an appropriate proceed-
ing, and the information sought may be reasonably calculated to lead
to admissible evidence, discovery will not be permitted if the informa-
tion sought is privileged,39 or if other defenses to discovery exist.40
While much of the Oklahoma law regarding privileges has been codi-
fied in article V of the recently adopted Oklahoma Evidence Code,4 '
additional privileges and defenses to discovery may be found in the
Oklahoma Constitution,42 statutes other than the Evidence Code,43
court rules,' and case law.45 This section -discusses the privileges as
well as other defenses to discovery with which the Oklahoma Supreme
Court has dealt in the context of discovery.46
A. Self-Incrimination
Both the United States and the Oklahoma Constitutions provide
that no person shall be compelled to give evidence that would tend to
incriminate him.4' Oklahoma courts have consistently held that the
privilege against self-incrimination is not limited to criminal prosecu-
tions, but instead extends to all types of proceedings including discov-
ery proceedings in connection with civil actions.48
In order for the privilege against self-incrimination to be applica-
ble, the evidence sought must be testimonial. Thus it has been held in
39. OKLA. CT. R. 14.
Discovery rules and statutes shall be liberally construed, provided, however, that all
matters that are privileged against disclosure at the trial, including, but not limited to,
privileged communications between a party or his agent and the attorney for the party,
are privileged against disclosure through any discovery procedure, and provided, further,
that material which contains or discloses the theories, mental impressions, or litigation
plans of a party's attorney may not be disclosed through any discovery procedure.
Id
40. See text accompanying notes 64-94 & 127-29 infra.
41. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 2501-2513 (Supp. 1980).
42. OKLA. CONsT. art. 2, §§ 21, 27 (privilege against self-incrimination).
43. E.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-1709 (1971) (medical reports prepared in connection with
studies to reduce morbidity or mortality are privileged). For other examples see notes 114-23
infra.
44. OKLA. CT. R. 14.
45. Carman v. Fishel, 418 P.2d 963 (Okla. 1966).
46. For general discussions of the law of privileges found in the Oklahoma Evidence Code
see Blakey, An Introduction to the Oklahoma Evidence Code: Relevancy, Competency, Privileges,
Witnesses, Opinion and Expert Witnesser, 14 TULSA L.J. 227, 279-95 (1978); McKinney, Commen-
tary.: Privileges, 32 OKLA. L. REV. 307 (1979).
47. U.S. CONsT. amend. V; OKLA. CONST. art. 2, §§ 21, 27.
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Oklahoma that requiring the defendant in a forgery prosecution to give
a handwriting exemplar did not violate his privilege against self-
incrimination because the exemplar was not testimonial but was in-
stead physical evidence used for identification purposes.49 On the other
hand, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has held that the privilege against
self-incrimination may apply not only to oral testimony in court or at a
deposition, but also to the production of documents in response to a
subpoena duces tecum in connection with a deposition 50 or a request
for the production of documents under section 548 of title 12 of the
Oklahoma Statutes. 5' The producton of documents may, in fact, be
testimonial because compelling a witness to produce documents which
are in his possession requires him to admit to the existence and custody
of the documents as well as impliedly to authenticate them.5 2
Before the self-incrimination privilege can be invoked successfully,
the court must also find that there is reasonable cause from the circum-
stances of the case to indicate that the information sought might tend to
incriminate the person attempting to invoke it. The mere assertion of
the privilege is not sufficient.5 3 To determine the validity of an asser-
tion of the privilege the court may conduct an in camera hearing at
which the court can hear the testimony or examine the documents or
other evidence as to which the privilege is asserted. 4
B. The Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege is frequently invoked in discovery
and is one of the most important defenses to discovery. This privilege
has been extensively discussed by others, 5 however, and therefore, it
will be noted here only briefly.
The attorney-client privilege is now codified in section 2502 of title
12 of the Oklahoma Statutes.56 The purpose of this privilege is to facil-
49. State v. Thomason, 538 P.2d 1080 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975). For examples of other types
of physical evidence that have been held not to be protected by the privilege against self-
incrimination see McCoRMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 124 (2d ed. E. Cleary
1972 & Supp. 1978) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK]; United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218
(1967) (voice identification at lineup); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (blood test).
50. Rey v. Means, 575 P.2d 116 (Okla. 1978).
51. Giles v. Doggett, 500 P.2d 574 (Okla. 1972). See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 548 (1971).
52. 575 P.2d at 119. For further discussion see McCoRMICK, supra note 49, § 126
53. 575 P.2d at 120. For further discussion see McCoRMICK, supra note 49, § 123.
54. 575 P.2d at 121.
55. The attorney-client privilege in Oklahoma is examined in Blakey, upra note 46, at 284-
87; McKinney, supra note 46, at 311-16. MCCORMICK, supra note 49, §§ 87-97, includes a very
thorough general discussion of the attorney-client privilege.
56. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2502 (Supp. 1980).
[Vol. 16:184
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itate full disclosure between an attorney and his client so that the attor-
ney can better represent his client's interests.5 7 The privilege extends to
all communications which are not intended to be disclosed to third per-
sons58 and which are made between an attorney and his client or any of
their representatives for the purpose of the attorney's rendering legal
services.5 9 The client holds the privilege and he may prevent any other
person from disclosing information protected by the privilege.60 An
attorney may also claim the privilege on behalf of his present or former
client,6 and he is under an ethical obligation to assert the privilege
where it is appropriate to do so.62 The attorney-client privilege is not
applicable if the attorney's services are sought to aid the client in com-
mitting a crime or fraud, and in various other circumstances.
63
C. Protection of Work Product of Attorneys and Experts
The protection afforded to the work product of attorneys and ex-
perts is an important restriction on the scope of discovery. The
Oklahoma Supreme Court has not only placed slightly different limits
on the scope of this protection than have the drafters of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, but it has also not yet addressed a number of
problems involving protection of work product that have arisen in fed-
eral courts. This section examines the protection from disclosure dur-
ing pretrial discovery which is given to the work product of attorneys
and experts prepared in anticipation of litigation as well as the special
protection given to the theories, mental impressions and litigation plans
of attorneys.
1. Protection of Attorney Work Product
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of giv-
ing special protection to attorney work product is to maintain the
integrity of the adversary system.' If a party to a lawsuit could dis-
cover evidence gathered by his opponent's attorney through investiga-
57. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 677, 682 (1981); McCoRMICK, supra note 49,
§ 87; McKinney, supra note 46, at 311.
58. See Marcus v. Harris, 496 P.2d 1177 (Okla. 1972) (holding that an attorney may testify at
a deposition concerning communications with his client which were not intended to be confiden-
tial).
59. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2502 (Supp. 1980).
60. Id § 2502(B)-(C) (Supp. 1980).
61. Id
62. Id tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3, Canon 4, DR 4-101 (1971).
63. Id tit. 12, § 2502(D) (Supp. 1980).
64. Carman v. Fishel, 418 P.2d 963, 969 (Okla. 1966).
1980]
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tion, that party might rely on his adversary's investigation instead of
performing his own.65 Inevitably the adversary's attorney would then
be forced to limit his own investigation so that the fruits of his investi-
gation would not be exposed through discovery. In the end none of the
attorneys representing the parties to a lawsuit would thoroughly inves-
tigate the case, and consequently both the clients and the interests of
justice would suffer.6 It is necessary, therefore, to balance the needs of
attorneys for privacy in investigating and preparing their cases against
the policy of permitting liberal use of discovery to aid in the fact-
finding process.
Carman v. Flishel,67 the earliest Oklahoma appellate decision deal-
ing with attorney work product, arose out of an automobile accident.
The plaintiff in Carman sought to obtain through discovery, inter alia,
the production of statements of witnesses to the accident, including the
plaintitf's statement, which the defendants had taken. The defendants
objected to the production of these statements on the grounds that they
were protected from discovery because they were the work product of
the defendants' attorneys and because the plaintiff had not shown good
cause for their production as required by statute.68 The Oklahoma
Supreme Court held that the witness statements were not protected
from discovery as attorney work product because the defendants failed
to make any showing in support of their attorney work product objec-
tion that the defendants' "attorneys personally took the statements. '69
The court, however, denied the plaintiff discovery of the witness state-
ments because she had not shown good cause for their production.7 °
Thus, the Carman court limited the protection afforded attorney work
product in Oklahoma to those materials personally prepared by attor-
neys in anticipation of litigation and held that the protection of attor-
ney work product did not extend to materials prepared in anticipation
of litigation by other persons, such as clients or insurance adjusters.7 '
In contrast, under the 1970 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the protection given to attorney work product is much
65. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 516-18 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring); Carman v.
Fishel, 418 P.2d 963, 969 (Okla. 1966).
66. 329 U.S. at 510-11.
67. 418 P.2d 963 (Okla. 1966).
68. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 548 (1971) provides for the production of documents and other
tangible things "[ulpon motion of any party showing good cause. ... Id
69. 418 P.2d at 969.
70. Id at 973.
71. Id at 969.
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broader and extends to materials "prepared in anticipation of litigation
or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's repre-
sentative (including his attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer
or agent)."72
The Carman case was followed in Lisle v. Owens,73 a case in which
the plaintiff alleged that the defendant car dealer had rolled back the
odometer on a car which the plaintiff had purchased from him. After
first obtaining the car dealer's records through discovery, the plaintiffs
attorney then sent written questionnaires to approximately 250 of the
car dealer's customers. The trial court granted the defendant's motion
to inspect the responses to the questionnaires. The Oklahoma Supreme
Court, however, issued a writ of prohibition against the enforcement of
the trial court's order on the grounds that the defendant had not shown
good cause for the production of the questionnaires and that they were
protected from discovery as attorney work product.74 The Lisle court
thus held that protection of attorney work product extended not only to
materials personally prepared by an attorney in anticipation of litiga-
tion, but also to an attorney's correspondence with third parties. 5
The Lisle court also noted that the protection of attorney work
product was not absolute, but instead could be overcome by a showing
of special circumstances which would prove that discovery of attorney
work product was essential to trial preparation, or that a denial of dis-
covery would result in injustice. 76 The court did not enumerate the
special circumstances that must be shown where the attorney work
product sought through discovery consists of witness statements ob-
tained by an attorney in anticipation of litigation. The Carman court
did state, however, that the showing of special circumstances required
for discovery of witness statements obtained by counsel in preparation
for trial is greater than the showing of good cause required for discov-
ery of witness statements obtained by a layman.77 It is likely that
Oklahoma courts would find federal authority78 persuasive and allow
discovery of witness statements obtained by an attorney if the party
72. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
73. 521 P.2d 1375 (Okla. 1974).
74. Id at 1378.
75. Id
76. Id
77. 418 P.2d at 969.
78. Advisory Notes to the 1970 Amendments, supra note 4, at 501. The showing required in
federal courts for discovery of attorney work product is thoroughly examined in 4 MOORE'S FED-
ERAL PRACTICE 26.64[3] (2d ed. 1979 & Supp. 1980-81); 8C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2025.
1980]
12
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 16 [1980], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol16/iss2/2
TULSA LAW JOUR[.1AL
seeking discovery could show that he could not obtain the substantial
equivalent of this information through other means. This showing
could be satisfied if the party is seeking discovery of the witness state-
ments for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of the witness with
a prior inconsistent statement;7 9 if the witness is no longer available at
the time discovery is sought, 0 or is hostile or reluctant to testify;81 or if
the witness statements which are sought were taken while the memory
of the witness was fresh.s2 In determining whether to allow discovery
of witness statements taken by an attorney in preparation for trial, an
Oklahoma court should also consider the discovering party's diligence,
and whether that party could have obtained the information at an ear-
lier time, such as when the witness' memory was fresh.83
In summary, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held in the Carman
and Lisle cases that attorney work product is protected from disclosure
during pre-trial discovery. The protection given to attorney work prod-
uct extends to documents personally prepared by an attorney in antici-
pation of litigation as well as correspondence between an attorney and
third parties in connection with litigation. This protection is qualified,
however, and may be overcome by a showing of special circumstances.
2. Special Protection for Attorney Mental Impressions
Because of the strong interest in allowing an attorney privacy in
preparing his case,84 special protection is given to materials containing
the theories, mental impressions, and litigation plans of a party's
attorney. Rule 14 of the Rules for the District Courts of Oklahoma
79. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495,511 (1947) (dictum); Rackers v. Siegfried, 54 F.R.D. 24,
26 (W.D. Mo. 1971); Advisory Notes to the 1970 Amendments, supra note 4, at 501; 4 MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.64[3] at 26-427 to -432 (2d ed. 1979); 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra
note 78, § 2025 at 226. See also In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1233 (3d Cir. 1979)
(distinguishing questionnaires completed by witnesses from memoranda of interviews with wit-
nesses prepared by attorneys).
80. 329 U.S. at 511 (dictum); 4 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.64[3] at 26426 to -427 (2d
ed. 1979); 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 78, § 2025 at 216.
81. Advisory Notes to the 1970 Amendments, supra note 4, at 501; 4 MOORE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE 26.64[3] at 26-427 to -432 (2d ed. 1979); 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 78,
§ 2025 at 218.
82. Clower v. Waiters, 51 F.R.D. 288 (S.D. Ala. 1970); Advisory Notes to the 1970 Amend-
ments, supra note 4, at 501; 4 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE T 26.64[3] at 26427 to -432 (2d ed.
1979); 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 78, § 2025 at 220-24.
83. Guilford Nat'l Bank v. Southern Ry., 297 F.2d 921, 926 (4th Cir. 1962); Almaguer v.
Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 55 F.R.D. 147, 150 (D. Neb. 1972); Stamatakos v. Hunter Shipping
Co., 49 F.R.D. 23,i25 (E.D. Pa. 1969), af'd, 491 F.2d 751 (3d CL. 1974); 4 MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE 26.64[3] at 26-435 to -438 (2d ed. 1979); 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 78,
§ 2025.
84. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947).
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provides that such materials may not be disclosed through any discov-
ery procedure.8 - The Oklahoma Supreme Court has not yet addressed
the issue of whether Rule 14 provides absolute protection from discov-
ery for attorney mental impressions, or whether some showing of ne-
cessity could overcome the protection. When this issue does arise, it is
probable that the Oklahoma Supreme Court will look for guidance to
persuasive federal precedent construing analogous language in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.86
3. Work Product of Experts
The work product of experts is also given limited protection from
discovery in Oklahoma state courts. Rule 14 of the Rules for the Dis-
trict Courts of Oklahoma empowers the trial court to require a party
requesting information which involves the facts or opinions of an
adverse party's expert, from either the adverse party's expert or the
adverse party himself, to pay a fair proportion of the expenses incurred
85. OKLA. CT. R. 14. "[M]aterial which contains or discloses the theories, mental impres-
sions or litigation plans of a party's attorney may not be disclosed through any discovery proce-
dure." Id
86. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). "[T]he court shall protect against disclosure of the mental im-
pressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party
concerning the litigation." Id. Recently the United States Supreme Court refused to decide
whether attorney mental impressions were absolutely protected from discovery in federal court.
The Court did hold though that at least a far stronger showing of necessity was required to obtain
discovery of attorney mental impressions than would be required for discovery of attorney work
product that did not contain attorney mental impressions. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 101 S. Ct.
677, 688-89 (1981). Other courts and commentators have taken the position that attorney mental
impressions are absolutely protected from discovery and that no showing of necessity could over-
come the absolute protection given to an attorney's mental impressions. Duplan Corp. v. Moulin-
age et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 509 F.2d 730, 734 (4th Cir. 1974)("[N]o showing of relevance,
substantial need or undue hardship should justify compelled disclosure of an attorney's mental
impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories."), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975); Advisory
Notes to the 1970 Amendments, supra note 4, at 502; 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 78,
§ 2026. But see EEOC v. Anchor Continental, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 523 (D.S.C. 1977) (disclosure of
government attorneys' opinions compelled where an in camera inspection revealed that the action
lacked merit and was brought for purposes of harassment); Handgards, Inc. v. Johnson & John-
son, 413 F. Supp. 926, 933 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (holding that "an attorney's opinion work product is
discoverable where such information is directly at issue and the need for production is compel-
ling"); Truck Ins. Exch. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 66 F.R.D. 129 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (discov-
ery of attorney's opinions compelled where they were directly at issue in the litigation); Bird v.
Penn Cent. Co., 61 F.R.D. 43, 47 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (discovery of attorneys' legal theories ordered
where they were directly at issue and the need for production was compelling); 4 MOORE'S FED-
ERAL PRACTICE 26.64[4] at 26-447 (2d ed. 1979). In addition, an attorney's theories and litiga-
tion plans may be subject to disclosure to some extent through the use of interrogatories and
requests for admission seeking a party's contentions. Advisory Notes to the 1970 Amendments,
supra note 4, at 502; 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 78, § 2026 at 232. The use of conten-
tion interrogatories and requests for admission will be explored in the next article in this series.
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to obtain the requested information." Rule 14 cannot, by itself, be
used as a defense to prevent discovery of an expert's work product; it
only permits a court to allocate the cost of the expert between the par-
ties. Furthermore, neither rule 14 nor Oklahoma case law provides an-
swers to a number of questions concerning the discovery of expert work
product in Oklahoma state courts. 8 For example, although rule 14
contemplates discovery of expert work product, it is not clear from rule
14 whether a party can discover the identities and anticipated testi-
mony of an adversary's expert witnesses prior to the pretrial confer-
ence.8 9 Assuming that discovery of this information is permitted in
Oklahoma prior to the pretrial conference, there are no guidelines for
the procedures to be followed to obtain it.90  It is also unclear in
87. OKLA. CT. R. 14.
When a party discovers the facts or opinions of an expert from either the expert or
the adverse party, the court, in its discretion, may require the party requesting the infor-
mation to pay the adverse party a fair proportion of the fees and expenses incurred by
the adverse party in obtaining the facts and opinions of the expert. If a party takes the
deposition of, or submits interrogatories to, an adverse party's expert, the court, in its
discretion, may require the party taking the deposition or submitting the interrogatory to
pay the expert a reasonable fee for the time that he expended in preparing for and giving
his deposition or in answering the interrogatory.
Id
88. The discovery of expert work product has been noted only briefly in a single Oklahoma
appellate decision, Unit Rig & Equip. Co. v. East, 514 P.2d 396 (Okla. 1973). For an exhaustive
discussion of many of the problems involving discovery of expert work product, see Graham,
Discovery of Experts Under Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Part One, an
Analytical Study, 1976 U. ILL. L. F. 895; Graham, Discovery of Experts Under Rule 26(b)(4) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Part Two, an Empirical Study anda Proposal, 1977 U. ILL. L. F.
169.
89. OKLA. CT. R. 5(c)(3), (d).
90. Under FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) a party may obtain through interrogatories the identity of
each expert that any other party expects to call as an expert witness at trial, as well as the subject
matter and substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify. This
discovery is allowed only after both parties know who their expert witnesses will be. Advisory
Notes to the 1970 Amendments, supra note 4, at 504; Leval, Discovery of Experts Under the Fed.
eralRules, 3 LMGATION 16, 18 (Fall 1976). In addition, the court may order further discovery
from an expert as it deems appropriate and may allocate the cost of the expert between the party
expecting to use his testimony at trial and the party seeking discovery from him. FED. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(4) also states that a party may obtain discovery from an expert who has been retained by
another party but is not expected to be called as a witness at trial, only upon a showing of excep-
tional circumstances, such as that the party seeking discovery cannot practically obtain the infor-
mation through other means.
California has recently adopted a procedure at CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 2037-2037.9 (West
Supp. 1981), whereby a party may demand an exchange of lists of expert witnesses from any other
party either within 10 days after the setting of a trial date or 70 days before trial, whichever is
later. The lists of expert witnesses are to contain the name and address of each expert the parties
expect to testify at trial, either through live testimony or deposition testimony, as well as a state-
ment of the qualifications of each expert and the general substance of his expected testimony. Id
§ 2037.3. A party who has properly served his list of expert witnesses on an adversary may pre-
vent that adversary from calling any expert not found on the list of expert witnesses served by the
adversary. Id § 2037.5. However, the court may permit an expert to testify despite the fact that
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Oklahoma whether a party may discover the identities and anticipated
testimony of only those experts that his adversary expects to call as
expert witnesses at trial,91 or whether a party may also discover the
identities of experts retained by the adversary party, but not expected
to be called as expert witnesses at trial.92 Nor is it clear whether a party
may discover the identities of experts who have been only informally
consulted by the adversary party, and who have not been retained and
are not expected to be called as expert witnesses at trial.93 There is no
statutory or case law in Oklahoma dealing with the situation where a
witness expected to be called at trial is not only an expert, but is also a
party or an employee of a party. The problem in this situation is
whether, and to what extent, such a witness should be considered an
expert witness.94 Thus many issues regarding the scope of the protec-
tion afforded expert work product remain to be addressed by the
Oklahoma courts and legislature.
D. Income Tax Returns
When a person's earnings are at issue in a lawsuit, a party will
often attempt to verify the correct amount by seeking production of
income tax returns. A person's income tax returns have traditionally
been considered confidential. 9 Nevertheless, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court, in line with most other state and federal courts which have con-
sidered this question, 96 has held that production of a party's income tax
returns may be compelled if that party has placed the amount of his
income in issue in a lawsuit.97 Income tax returns are afforded some
he is not included on a party's list, if that party made a good faith effort to include all his experts
on the list, he gave prompt notice to the other parties when he decided to call the expert not on the
list, and certain other conditions are satisfied. Id § 2037.6.
91. OKLA. CT. R. 5(c)(3), (d), provides for disclosure at the pretrial conference of the identi-
ties and testimony of witnesses that the parties expect to call at trial.
92. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B) permits discovery from an expert who has been retained by a
party but who is not expected to be called to testify as an expert witness at trial only upon a
showing of exceptional circumstances. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE. §§ 2037-2037.9 (West Supp. 1981)
does not provide for discovery from such experts. See note 90 supra.
93. The discovery of the identities and testimony of informally consulted experts is precluded
under FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B). Ager v. Jane C. Stormont Hosp., 622 F.2d 496, 501 (10th Cir.
1980); Advisory Notes to the 1970 Amendments, supra note 4, at 504. No provision is made in
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 2037-2037.9 (West Supp. 1981) for discovery from such experts.
94. This problem is discussed in the context of federal discovery practice in Leval, supra note
90, at 16.
95. I.R.C. § 6103(a) (information in income tax returns is confidential and should not be
disclosed by government officials except in the specific situations listed in § 6103).
96. Annot., 70 A.L.R.2d 240 (1960 & Supp. 1980).
97. Matchen v. McGahey, 455 P.2d 52, 55-57 (Okla. 1969); accord, Biliske v. American Live
Stock Ins. Co., 73 F.R.D. 124 (W.D. Okla. 1977).
1980]
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protection in Oklahoma, however, since production of a person's tax
returns may not be compelled unless that person has waived his
privilege by placing his income in issue."s Thus, the income tax returns
of a person who is not a party to the lawsuit are privileged and their
production may not be compelled. Moreover, a court, in ordering pro-
duction of an income tax return, should impose whatever restrictions it
deems appropriate, such as ordering the parties not to disclose the con-
tents of the return to others or limiting inspection to those portions with
respect to which the privilege has been waived. 99
E. Physician-Patient Privilege
Prior to the adoption of the Oklahoma Evidence Code in 1978,
section 385(6) of title 12 of the Oklahoma Statutes provided that a phy-
sician was incompetent to testify concerning communications from a
patient regarding any disease of the patient or any knowledge the phy-
sician acquired by examining the patient.' °° However, section 385(6)
also provided for a waiver of the physician-patient privilege if the pa-
tient offered himself as a witness at trial.' 0' The waiver provision was
construed narrowly by the Oklahoma Supreme Court which held, in a
line of cases, that the physician-patient privilege was not waived by a
party's placing his physical condition in issue, 0 2 or even by a patient's
testifying about his physical condition and disclosing communications
to his physician in response to cross-examination at a deposition. 10 3
Since the physician-patient privilege was not waived under section
385(6) until the patient actually testified at trial, the physician-patient
privilege could greatly restrict discovery. The plaintiff's invoking the
physician-patient privilege in a typical personal injury case prevented
the defendant from obtaining any discovery from the plaintiffs doctor
prior to trial. Once the plaintiff testified at trial concerning his injury
and treatment, however, he thereby waived the physician-patient privi-
lege, and the defendant could then obtain a continuance in order to
take the deposition of the plaintiffs doctor, whom he was precluded
98. Id at 56 (dictum); Application of Umbach, 350 P.2d 299 (Okla. 1960).
99. 455 P.2d at 56.
100. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 385(6) (1971) (repealed 1977).
101. Robinson v. Lane, 480 P.2d 620 (Okla. 1971). In addition, Oklahoma courts have en-
forced written waivers of the physician-patient privilege, as in applications for life insurance, e.g.,
Templeton v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 177 Okla. 94, 57 P.2d 841 (1936).
102. Gulf Oil Co. v. Woodson, 505 P.2d 484, 487 (Okla. 1972); Avery v. Nelson, 455 P.2d 75,
79 (Okla. 1969); St. Louis-S.F. Ry. v. Kilgore, 366 P.2d 936, 940 (Okla. 1961).
103. Avery v. Nelson, 455 P.2d 75, 77 (Okla. 1969).
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from deposing prior to trial. 04
It is no longer necessary for a defendant in a personal injury action
in an Oklahoma court to follow such a circuitous procedure to investi-
gate the extent of a plaintiffs injuries. Since 1978, a defendant in a
typical Oklahoma personal injury action has been able to obtain pre-
trial discovery regarding a plaintiff's physical condition under section
2503(D)(3)10 5 of the Oklahoma Evidence Code from the plaintiffs own
doctors as long as the plaintiff has placed his physical condition in is-
sue. '
0 6
F. Dead Man's Statute
Formerly, Oklahoma's Dead Man's Statute precluded a party
from testifying with respect to a communication or transaction with a
deceased person in actions where the adverse party was a successor in
interest to the deceased person or a representative of his estate.1
0 7
Early cases held that the taking of the deposition of a party who was
incompetent to testify under the Oklahoma Dead Man's Statute was a
waiver of the statute by the party taking the deposition, and thereafter
the party whose deposition had been taken could testify with respect to
communications or transactions with the deceased person.' 0 8 These
early decisions were overruled by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in
1975 because they penalized a party for taking the deposition of an
opposing party and hence were contrary to the modem policy of pro-
moting discovery.'0 9 The court held that a waiver of the Dead Man's
Statute would result, however, if an incompetent party's deposition
were offered into evidence either at trial or on a motion for summary
104. Herbert v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 544 P.2d 898 (Okla. 1975).
105. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2503(D)(3) (Supp. 1980) now provides:
The privilege under this Code as to a communication relevant to the physical,
mental or emotional condition of the patient in any proceeding in which the patient
relies upon that condition as an element of his claim or defense or, after the patient's
death, in any proceeding in which any party relies upon the condition as an element of
his claim or defense, is qualified to the extent that an adverse party in said proceeding
may obtain relevant information regarding said condition by statutory discovery.
Id For an earlier version of this provision, see OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2503(D)(3) (Supp. 1979).
106. For further discussions of the physician-patient privilege under the Oklahoma Evidence
Code see Blakey, supra note 46, at 288-91; Blakey, An Introduction to the Oklahoma Evidence
Code: The Thirty-Fourth Hearsay Exception, Information Relied Upon as a Basis for Admissible
Expert Opinion, 16 TuLSA L.J. 1, 28-34 (1980); McKinney, supra note 46, at 316-24.
107. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 384 (1971) (repealed 1978).
108. Dean v. Jelsma, 316 P.2d 599 (Okla. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 954 (1958); Cox v.
Gettys, 53 Okla. 58, 156 P. 892 (1916).
109. Davis v. Davis, 536 P.2d 915, 918 (Okla. 1975).
19801
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Oklahoma's Dead Man's Statute was abolished in 1978 with the
adoption of the Oklahoma Evidence Code."' Hence the difficulties in
interpreting the Dead Man's Statute have been eliminated.
G. Miscellaneous Privileges
In addition to the privileges discussed above, a large number of
specialized privileges created by statute also exist." t2 For example,
medical information obtained by a hospital for use in mortality stud-
ies,' t3 records of child care facilities," t4 records of facilities for drug
dependent persons, "t5 records relating to pri ,ate trusts kept by banks or
trust companies, 1 6 annual reports of employees required by the Com-
missioner of Labor," 7 complaints filed with the State Ethics Commis-
sion"" or the Council on Judicial Complaints,"t9 and proceedings
before grand juries20 or the Council on Judicial Complaints' 2' are pro-
tected from disclosure by specific statutes. Moreover, materials such as
customer records kept by financial institutions 122 and records of autop-
sies by medical examiners 123 are made confidential by statute and they
are not subject to discovery unless special procedures are followed.
H. Effect at Trial of a Claim of Privilege During Discovery
Even though a party may have the right to claim a privilege and
refuse to divulge confidential material, he may for tactical reasons wish
to divulge the material or it may be necessary for him to do so in order
110. Id at 919.
111. Subcommittee on Evidence of the Code Procedure--Civil Committee of the Oklahoma
Bar Association, Proposed Oklahoma Code of Evidence, 47 OKLA. B.A.J. 2605, 2634 (1976).
112. These special statutory privileges are scattered throughout the Oklahoma Statutes, mak-
ing it difficult for the practitioner to gain access to them. It would be helpful if these privileges
could be consolidated into a single section in the Oklahoma Evidence Code, or if a comprehensive
index listing them could be devised.
113. Edmond v. Parr, 587 P.2d 56 (Okla. 1978); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-1709 (1971).
114. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, §406 (1971).
115. Id tit. 43A, § 657.
116. Id tit. 6, § 1013.
117. Id tit. 40, § 417.
118. Id tit. 74, § 1408 (Supp. 1980).
119. Council on Judicial Complaints v. Maley, 607 P.2d 1180, 1183-87 (Okla. 1980) (dictum).
120. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 341-343 (1971).
121. Id tit. 20, § 1658 (Supp. 1980).
122. Nichols v. Council on Judicial Complaints, 615 P.2d 280 (Okla. 1980); OKLA. STAT. tit. 6,
2201-2206 (Supp. 1980).
123. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 949 (Supp. 1980).
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to establish his claim or defense at trial. Section 2511124 of the
Oklahoma Evidence Code provides that a person who is the holder of a
privilege may waive it by voluntary disclosure of the privileged mate-
rial. Thus, a person who has the right to claim a privilege is generally
not required to do so, but instead may elect to waive the privilege and
divulge privileged material at trial.
An exception to the general rule permitting waiver of a privilege at
trial should be recognized where a party seeking waiver at trial has
claimed the privilege during discovery and has thus prevented his ad-
versary from obtaining disclosure of the privileged material before
trial. Even though a claim of privilege made during discovery may be
justified, a party should not be permitted to circumvent the policy of
liberal discovery and unfairly surprise his adversary by waiving the
privilege at trial after claiming it during discovery. The Oklahoma de-
cisions which allowed a party to waive the physician-patient privilege
at trial after it was asserted during discovery 25 should be repudiated.
Instead, Oklahoma courts should follow precedent from other jurisdic-
tions where a party is precluded from introducing evidence at trial after
waiving a privilege claimed during discovery, unless that party dis-
closed the evidence to his adversary within a reasonable period before
trial.126
I. After-Acquired Information
Rule 14(b) of the Rules for the District Courts of Oklahoma pro-
vides that a party who has responded to a request for discovery has no
duty to furnish after-acquired information unless the court otherwise
requires. 27 This rule can be contrasted with Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 26(e) which requires a party in federal court to supplement
responses to requests for discovery under certain specified circum-
124. Id. tit. 12, § 2511. "A person upon whom this Code confers a privilege against disclosure
waives the privilege if he or his predecessor voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of any
signficant part of the privileged matter. This section does not apply if the disclosure itself is privi-
leged." Id
125. Herbert v. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. R.R., 544 P.2d 898 (Okla. 1975); St. Louis-S.F. Ry. v.
Iilgore, 366 P.2d 936 (Okla. 1961).
126. Duffy v. Currier, 291 F. Supp. 810, 815 (D. Minn. 1968) (dictum); James Talcott, Inc. v.
Short, 100 Cal. App. 3d 504, 161 Cal. Rptr. 63 (1979); A & M Records, Inc. v. Heilman, 75 Cal.
App. 3d 554, 566-67, 142 Cal. Rptr. 390, 397-98 (1977), appeal dismised, cert. denied, 436 U.S. 952
(1978); Christenson v. Christenson, 281 Minn. 507, 162 N.W.2d 194 (1968); Meyer v. Second Judi-
cial Dist. Court, 95 Nev. 176, 591 P.2d 259 (1979). But see Hunter v. Kenney, 77 N.M. 336, 422
P.2d 623 (1967); Annot., 36 A.L.R.3d 1367 (1971 & Supp. 1980).
127. OKLA. CT. R. 14(b). "A party who has responded to a request for discovery is under no
duty to furnish after-acquired information unless specifically required by the court." Id
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stances.1 28 Imposing a duty to furnish after-acquired information may
be onerous because the parties must continually recheck their previous
discovery responses against any new information they receive and
determine whether this new information would materially alter any of
their responses. Not imposing such a duty, however, forces parties to
serve additional sets of follow-up interrogatories in order to avoid un-
fair surprise at trial. 129
Because there is no duty in Oklahoma state courts to provide after-
acquired information, follow-up interrogatories should be served
shortly before trial seeking any facts found by a party that would alter
or are necessary to supplement his earlier responses to discovery.' 30
Follow-up interrogatories seeking after-acquired information should be
freely allowed in Oklahoma, since the number of sets of interrogatories
that may be served in an Oklahoma state court action is not limited
except as is required by justice. 3 1
VI. USE OF DISCOVERY PRODUCTS OTHER THAN AT TRIAL
Despite the conclusion of an early commentator, 132 products of
discovery can be used in hearings on motions, such as summary judg-
ment motions, where the oral testimony of witnesses is not required.
Rule 13133 of the Rules for the District Courts of Oklahoma provides
that a court should consider discovery products, including deposi-
tions, 34 interrogatories, and admissions, as well as affidavits submitted
128. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e).
129. Advisory Notes to the 1970 Amendments, supra note 4, at 507.
130. See CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA CIVIL DISCOVERY
PRACTICE 343 (1975).
131. Oklahoma County Sheriff v. Hunter, 615 P.2d 1007 (Okla. 1980); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12,
§ 549(b) (1971).
132. Note, Hearsay Evidence, 5 OKLA. L. REy. 345, 358 (1952).
133. OKLA. CT. R. 13.
A party may move for judgment in his favor on the ground that the depositions,
admissions, answers to interrogatories, and affidavits on file, filed with his motion or
subsequently filed with leave of court show that there is no substantial controversy as to
any material fact. The adverse party may file affidavits and other materials in opposition
to the motion. The affidavits which are filed by either party shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall show that the affiant is competent to testify as to the matters stated
therein, and shall set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence. The court shall
render judgment if it appears that there is no substantial controversy as to any material
fact and that any party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. If the court finds that
there is no substantial controversy as to certain facts or issues, it shall make an order
specifying the facts or issues which are not in controversy and direct that the action
proceed for a determination of the facts or issues.
134. In St. Francis Hosp. Inc. v. Group Hosp. Serv., 598 P.2d 238 (Okla. 1979), the Oklahoma
Supreme Court held that rule 13 did not contemplate the use of "oral" depositions consisting of
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by the parties, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. 35
Although there are not yet any Oklahoma appellate court deci-
sions dealing with the issue, it is suggested that Oklahoma courts
should follow persuasive precedent 136 from other jurisdictions which
gives the products of discovery greater weight than the often self-
serving affidavits submitted by the parties in connection with summary
judgment motions. Frequently, discovery may reveal that certain is-
sues are without substantial controversy or that a party is entitled to
summary judgment because no issues of fact exist in the action. How-
ever, when a party moves for an order that certain issues are without
substantial controversy or for summary judgment, he may find his ad-
versary opposing the motion with self-serving affidavits contradicting
admissions made during discovery. Some courts, when faced with such
a situation, have decided that the admissions of a party established in
pretrial discovery "should receive a kind of deference not normally ac-
corded evidentiary allegations in affidavits,"' 37 at least where it is not
asserted that the party's admissions in pretrial discovery were based on
clerical error, error in transcription, or the party's misunderstanding of
the questions asked him. 38 A court should grant a motion for sum-
mary judgment despite the presence of affidavits contradicting admis-
sions made during discovery on the grounds that an admission
produced through discovery is a kind of informal judicial admission
which binds the party making the admission and precludes him from
live testimony taken in open court at an evidentiary hearing on a motion for summary judgment.
The trial court in St. Francis heard the testimony of several witnesses who had previously given
their depositions in order to save the time of reading their lengthy depositions. Finding that the
use of such "oral" depositions was not appropriate on a motion for summary judgment, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed the trial court's granting of a summary judgment motion. Id
at 241.
135. Hogue v. A.B. Chance Co., 592 P.2d 973 (Okla. 1978); Weeks v. Wedgewood Village,
Inc., 554 P.2d 780 (Okla. 1976); Beck v. Bacone College, 604 P.2d 876 (Okla. Ct. App. 1979).
136. Radobenko v. Automated Equip. Corp., 520 F.2d 540 (9th Cir. 1975); D'Amico v. Board
of Medical Examiners, 11 Cal. 3d 1, 20-22, 520 P.2d 10, 24-25, 112 Cal. Rptr. 786, 800-01 (1974);
Mikialian v. Los Angeles, 79 Cal. App. 3d 150, 159-63, 144 Cal. Rptr. 794, 799-802 (1978); Gray v.
Reeves, 76 Cal. App. 3d 567, 571-74, 142 Cal. Rptr. 716, 718-21 (1978); Leasman v. Beech Aircraft
Corp., 48 Cal. App. 3d 376, 121 Cal. Rptr. 768 (1975); Wachovia Mortgage Co. v. Autry-Barker-
Spurrier Real Estate, Inc., 39 N.C. App. 1, 249 S.E.2d 727 (1978). Contra, Gaines v. Hamman,
163 Tex. 618, 358 S.W.2d 557 (1962); Sifford v. Santa Rosa Medical Center, 524 S.W.2d 559 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1975, no writ).
137. D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners, 11 Cal. 3d 1, 22, 520 P.2d 10, 25, 112 Cal. Rptr.
786, 801 (1974); Mikialian v. Los Angeles, 79 Cal. App. 3d 150, 161, 144 Cal. Rptr. 794, 801
(1978).
138. Mikialian v. Los Angeles, 79 Cal. App. 3d 150, 162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 794, 801 (1978); Gray
v. Reeves, 76 Cal. App. 3d 567, 574, 142 Cal. Rptr. 716, 720 (1978).
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contradicting it later in the action.' 39 In short, a party should not be
able to avoid a summary judgment motion based on admissions he
made during discovery merely by filing an .affidavit contradicting the
admissions that were made before he became aware of their signifi-
cance. If a party were able to avoid summary judgment in this manner,
the usefulness and importance of both pretrial discovery and the sum-
mary judgment motion would be greatly reduced.
VII. THE ROLE OF TRIAL COURT DISCRETION AND THE EXTENT OF
APPELLATE REVIEW OF DISCOVERY ORDERS
A discovery order usually is not appealable under the Oklahoma
Statutes, 40 either as a judgment or as an appealable order.' 4' Gener-
ally, the only routes available to obtain appellate review of a discovery
order are through the extraordinary writs of mandamus and prohibi-
tion 14  or appeal from the final judgment in the action.' 43 Because
neither of these routes to appellate review is very effective, 4" and be-
cause a discovery order generally provides the prevailing party with
only a minor tactical advantage, the role of the trial court's discretion
in granting or limiting discovery is necessarily great.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court expressed its general attitude to-
ward providing appellate review of discovery orders in Carman v.
Fishel.
[W]e are also mindful of the fact that the statute on discov-
139. Mikialian v. Los Angeles, 79 Cal. App. 3d 150, 162-63, 144 Cal. Rptr. 794, 801-02 (1978).
140. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 952 (1971).
141. Lisle v. Owens, 521 P.2d 1375, 1377 (Okla. 1974); Carman v. Fishel, 418 P.2d 963, 968
(Okla. 1966). However, where the only proceeding pending is the application for i discovery
order, the discovery order should be appealable. Thus it has been held that a court order denying
an application brought under the Oklahoma Administrative Procedures Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 75,
§ 315(3) (1971), for the enforcement of an agency's power to compel answers to interrogatories is a
final and appealable order. Oklahoma Human Rights Comm'n v. Wilson Certified Foods, Inc.,
536 P.2d 349 (Okla. 1975). In addition, a discovery order should be appealable as a final order
under OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 953 (1971): where a party brings a proceeding under the Uniform
Perpetuation of Testimony Act, id §§ 538.1-.13 (1971 & Supp. 1980); where a party seeks the
taking of a deposition or the production of documents in Oklahoma for use in an action outside of
Oklahoma under the Uniform Foreign Depositions Act, id §§ 461-463 (1971), or under id
§ 1703.02; or where a person is found guilty of criminal contempt for failure to comply with a
discovery order. For discussions of appellate review of discovery orders in federal courts see 4
MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.37 (2d ed. 1979); 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 78,
§ 2006.
142. Warren v. Myers, 554 P.2d 1171, 1173-74 (Okla. 1976); Cowen v. Hughes, 509 P.2d 461,
462 (Okla. 1973).
143. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co. v. Chez, 527 P.2d 165, 167 (Okla. 1974); Norman Plumb.
Supply Co. v. Gilles, 512 P.2d 1177 (Okla. 1973).
144. Carman v. Fishel, 418 P.2d 963, 968 (Okla. 1966).
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ery necessarily invests the trial court with a wide discretion in
determining when and to what extent such act shall be appli-
cable in a particular proceeding. If the trial court were not
clothed with discretion in such matters, the obvious purpose
of the statute to afford to litigants more precise and certain
justice would be defeated. We are therefore in this cause, and
will be in future cases, reluctant to interfere in the action of
the trial courts and will not do so except in those instances
when it may be shown that the trial court clearly exceeded its
authority. 145
Despite the Carman court's expressed reluctance to interfere with the
discretion of trial courts, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has, in fact,
granted writs of prohibition and mandamus to overturn discovery or-
ders of trial courts in a number of cases decided since Carman .146 The
issuance of writs of prohibition and mandamus is at the discretion of
the Oklahoma Supreme Court, and these writs can be obtained only on
a showing that the trial court acted outside the scope of its authority or
clearly abused its discretion in making the discovery order for which
appellate review is sought. 147
The availability of appellate review of a discovery order through
appeal from the final judgment is greatly restricted by the difficulty of
showing prejudice resulting from an erroneous discovery order. The
party seeking reversal of a final judgment on account of a discovery
order has the burden of showing not only that the order was erroneous,
but also that the error was prejudicial. 148 No Oklahoma case has been
reported in which a party has sustained this burden with respect to a
discovery order. Reversal because of an erroneous grant of discovery
would be ineffective since there is no way to correct such an order once
discovery has been had. 149 On the other hand, reversal due to an erro-
neous denial of discovery is possible, but only if the required showing
of prejudice can be made.' 50
145. Id, accord, Warren v. Myers, 554 P.2d 1171, 1174 (Okla. 1976).
146. Eg., Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. District Court, 571 P.2d 1228 (Okla. 1977); Wilson v. Naifeh,
539 P.2d 390 (Okla. 1975); Lisle v. Owens, 521 P.2d 1375 (Okla. 1974); Jones Packing Co. v.
Caldwell, 510 P.2d 683 (Okla. 1973); Cowen v. Hughes, 509 P.2d 461 (Okla. 1973).
147. Warren v. Myers, 554 P.2d 1171, 1173-74 (Okla. 1976).
148. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co. v. Chez, 527 P.2d 165, 167 (Okla. 1974); Norman Plumb.
Supply Co. v. Gilles, 512 P.2d 1177, 1178 (Okla. 1973).
149. 4 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE T 26.83 [101 (2d ed. 1979); 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
supra note 78, § 2006 at 34-36.
150. Id See also Voegeli v. Lewis, 568 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1977); Mellon v. Cooper-Jarrett, Inc.,
424 F.2d 499 (6th Cir. 1970).
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This article has dealt with the basic principles that apply to all
forms of discovery. In order to use discovery procedures effectively an
attorney must not only understand these basic principles but also must
have a thorough knowledge of the individual characteristics of the vari-
ous discovery devices that are available in Oklahoma state courts. An
attorney with an appreciation of the respective strengths and weak-
nesses of the tools of discovery can use his knowledge to fashion a dis-
covery plan for each lawsuit so that he can obtain the information he
needs to prepare for trial in an efficient and cost-effective manner.' 5 '
The next two articles in this series, which are to be published in subse-
quent issues of this journal, will be devoted to a detailed examination
of written interrogatories, requests for admission, the discovery proce-
dures for the production of documents and tangible things, the proce-
dure to obtain medical examinations of parties, and oral depositions.
The advantages of each of these discovery devices will be compared,
and suggestions will be made for their effective use.
151. See Ehrenbard, Cutting Discovery Costs Through Interrogatories and Document Requests,
I LITIGATION 17 (Spring 1975); Figg, McCullough & Underwood, Uses and Limitations of Some
Discovery Devices, 20 PRAc. LAW. 65 (April 1974); Thompson, How to Use Written Interrogatories
Effectively, 16 PRAc. LAW. 81 (Feb. 1970).
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